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MARYLAND'S DNA DATA BASE SYSTEM AND
REPOSITORY: DOES IT PASS CONSTITUTIONAL
MUSTER?
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal and law enforcement communities are experiencing an
explosion of interest in the advancing field of DNA' technology. This
interest stems from a scientific procedure, commonly known as DNA
fingerprinting, 2 which utilizes DNA to identify persons through the
creation of an individual-specific DNA fingerprint.3 DNA fingerprint-
ing is based upon the fact that, with the exception for identical
twins, each individual has an entirely unique genetic code which is
stored in the DNA of that particular individual. 4 Additionally, be-
cause DNA fingerprinting is sensitive and accurate, it has gained
wide acceptance in both the legal and the law enforcement commu-
nities.' As a result, twenty-five states, 6 including Maryland, have
1. DNA stands for deoxyribonucleic acid. See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 4 (2d ed. 1989).
2. There are three types of DNA analysis based on different principles. Kamrin
T. MacKnight, Comment, The Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR): The Second
Generation of DNA Analysis Methods Takes the Stand, 9 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 287, 293 (1993). Scientifically, DNA fingerprint-
ing only refers to one of these types of analysis known as Restriction Fragment
Length Polymorphism (RFLP). Id. at 294 n.29. However, people unfamiliar
with molecular biology often group all DNA testing methods under the term
"DNA Fingerprinting." Id.
In this Comment, DNA fingerprinting will only be used to refer to the
RFLP technique.
3. A DNA fingerprint is also termed a DNA profile or a DNA blueprint. E.
Donald Shapiro & Michelle L. Weinberg, DNA Data Banking: The Dangerous
Erosion of Privacy, 38 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 455, 455 (1990).
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Cobey v. State, 80 Md. App. 31, 35-36 & n.7, 559 A.2d 391, 392-
93 & n.7 (1989) (claiming that DNA fingerprinting can "identify a suspect with
'virtual certainty'); Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (accepting DNA fingerprinting); People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643
(Albany County Ct. 1988) (same).
6. As of October 1, 1994, the following states have enacted DNA data banking
statutes: Alabama (ALA. CODE §§ 36-18-20 to -39 (Supp. 1994)); Arizona (ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-281 (Supp. 1994)); California (CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.2
(West 1988 & Supp. 1995)); Colorado (COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-2-
201(5)(g)(I) (West Supp. 1989)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West
Supp. 1995)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-60 (1995)); Hawaii (HAw. REV.
STAT. § 706-603 (Supp. 1992)); Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 5/5-4-
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enacted legislation allowing for the establishment of repositories for
the storage of DNA samples7 obtained from convicted persons' and
for the storage of the fingerprints or profiles derived from the DNA
analysis. 9 The purpose of these DNA data banks is twofold: to
further criminal law enforcement by providing an accurate identifi-
cation method in criminal investigations and to deter recidivist acts. 10
In addition to state action, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) is building a massive national DNA data bank system" called
"CODIS" in order to facilitate the transfer of information between
data banks. 2 Once this system is operational, "CODIS will involve
a centralized index that references the sources of all DNA profiles,
with supporting records maintained at the state level."' 3 Congress
3 (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1995)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. §§ 20-12-34.5-
1 to .5-6 (Michie 1991)); Iowa (IowA CODE ANN. §§ 13.10, 901.2, 906.4 (West
1995)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511 (Cumm. Supp. 1994)); Kentucky
(Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.170, 17.175 (Baldwin 1995)); Louisiana (LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 15:535, 15:536, 15:578 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995)); Maryland
(MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, § 12A (1994)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 28.171 to .176 (West Supp. 1995)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3461
(West 1991 & Supp. 1994)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 650.050 to .057
(Vernon Supp. 1995)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 176.111, 179A.075
(Michie Repl. Vol. 1992)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-266 to -
266.12 (Supp. 1994)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 584 (West 1991
& Supp. 1995)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 181.085 (1993)); South Dakota
(S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23-5-14 (Supp. 1995)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 38-6-113, 40-35-321 (Supp. 1995)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
310.5 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1995)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
43.43.752 (West Supp. 1995)); and West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 15-2-24a
(Repl. Vol. 1995)).
For a comprehensive identification of enacted and pending DNA data bank
legislation as of December 31, 1993, see Jean E. McEwen & Philip R. Reilly,
A Review of State Legislation on DNA Forensic Data Banking, 54 AM. J.
HuM. GENETICS, 941 (1994).
7. The storage facilities for the DNA samples are often called DNA banks or
DNA repositories. See McEwen & Reilly, supra note 6, at 941.
8. The "convicted persons" from whom the DNA sample is to be obtained is
defined differently according to the various state statutes. See id. at 944.
9. The storage facilities for the profiles are often called DNA data banks or DNA
database systems. See id. at 941.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 941; Manning A. Connors, III, Comment, DNA Databases: The
Case for the Combined DNA Index System, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 857,
857 & n.5 (1994); see also Jeffrey L. Fox, FBI Embracing Genetic Fingerprints,
7 BIOTECHNOLOGY 551 (1989) ("The bureau is building a data base .... );
Shapiro & Weinberg, supra note 3, at 486 n.97 ("[Tlhe FBI ... is already
developing a computerized database.").
12. "CODIS" stands for Combined DNA Identification System. McEwen & Reilly,
supra note 6, at 941; Connors, supra note 11, at 857.
13. McEwen & Reilly, supra note 6, at 941; see also Connors, supra note 11, at
857.
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has even proposed legislation which will make the DNA banks of
individual states eligible for federal grants if they follow certain
guidelines with respect to quality assurance and proficient testing
standards. 14
This Comment analyzes a variety of constitutional implica-
tions pertaining to Maryland's DNA data banking statute. Section II
of this Comment explains the science behind DNA technology and
the procedures used to perform DNA fingerprinting. Section III
discusses some constitutional implications of DNA data banking
statutes. Section IV analyzes the constitutionality of Maryland's DNA
data base system and repository statute. Finally, this Comment
proffers the conclusion that Maryland's DNA data base system and
repository statute would withstand constitutional challenges.
II. DNA TECHNOLOGY
In general, DNA technology is at the "cutting edge" of science.
Particularly, "DNA fingerprinting is at the 'cutting edge' of forensic
science[.]"' 5 DNA fingerprinting is a process that has arisen from
the scientific fields of molecular and cell biology and genetics. In
order to understand DNA fingerprinting, it is helpful to have a
knowledge of some of the basic principles of these two scientific
fields. The first part of this section will address these principles, and
the second part of this section will explain the testing procedures.
A. The Scientific Principles Relied Upon for DNA Fingerprinting
The cell is the fundamental unit of living organisms.16 Most cells
contain two basic components-the nucleus and the cytoplasm. 7 The
nucleus of the cell contains the DNA, 18 which is the prime genetic
molecule. 19 "While DNA is the basic material of heredity, a gene is
14. H.R. 829, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 497, 103d Congress, 1st Sess. (1993)
(the DNA Identification Act of 1993); see McEwen & Reilly, supra note 6, at
942 (discussing the DNA Identification Act of 1993); Connors, supra note 11,
at 857 (discussing the DNA Identification Act of 1993).
15. People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Albany County Ct. 1988).
16. Id. at 645.
17. There are two classes of cells: prokaryotic cells (the cells of bacteria and blue
green algae) and eukaryotic cells (the cells of plant, animals, protists, and
fungi). LELAND G. JOHNSON, BIOLOGY 78 (John Stout et al. eds., 1983). The
major difference between the two is that prokaryotic cells lack a distinct,
membrane-bound nucleus and eukaryotic cells possess a membrane-bound
nucleus. Id.
18. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 1, at 17.
19. Id. at 95.
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considered 'the basic structural and functional unit of heredity." '' 20
DNA consists of two complementary polynucleotide 21 strands in
the form of a double helix. 22 "The traditional analogy [of the DNA
double-helix model] is [that of] a [twisted] ladder. ' 23 Each nucleotide
in a strand is composed of a nitrogenous base and a sugar24 which
is linked by a phosphate group to the sugar of the adjacent nucle-
otide. 25 One of the four nitrogenous bases, adenine (A), cytosine (C),
guanine (G) or thymine (T), is attached on the inside of the sugar-
phosphate chain. 26 The two strands are then joined together by
hydrogen bonds between pairs of the bases-A is always paired with
T and G is always paired with C. 27 Thus, with respect to the twisted
ladder analogy, the bases and their hydrogen bonds are the rungs of
the ladder and the sugar-phosphate chains are the sides of the ladder. 28
The order of the bases is very unique and thus, the "precise sequence
of bases carries the genetic information. ' 29
A set of three adjacent bases on one strand of the DNA molecule
is called a codon ° which specifies one amino acid.3 "Amino acids
are called the 'building blocks' of [protein molecules] because proteins
are linear polymers of amino acids." '3 2 A gene is a hereditary unit,
composed of a group of codons located at a particular site on a
chromosome.33 A chromosome is a long, thread-like body enveloped
by the nucleus of the cell.34 "The genes of greatest interest in genetic
analysis are those for which there are many variations and are thus
20. JoAnn M. Longobardi, Note, DNA Fingerprinting and the Need for a National
Data Base, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 323, 326 (1989) (quoting J. BAKER & G.
ALLEN, THE STUDY OF BIOLOGY 442 (4th ed. 1982)).
21. "Polynucleotide" means many nucleotides. See JOHNSON, supra note 17, at G-
16. A nucleotide is "[an organic compound consisting of a nitrogen-containing
base . . . , a five-carbon sugar, and phosphoric acid." See id. at G-13.
22. JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 240-41 (4th ed.
1987). In 1953 James Watson and Francis Crick discovered the double helical
structure of DNA. Id. at iii. They were awarded the Nobel Prize in 1962 for
their discovery. Id.
23. Longobardi, supra note 20, at 326.
24. The sugar is deoxyribose. LUBERT STRYER, BIOCHEMISTRY 72 (3d ed. 1988).
25. WATSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 241. The sugar-phosphate backbone is
structural and very regular. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Longobardi, supra note 20, at 326.
29. STRYER, supra note 24, at 76.
30. WATSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 223-24.
31. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 1, at 102.
32. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at G-2. An amino acid is "[a]n organic compound
with an amino group (NH3) and a carboxyl group (COOH) bonded to the
same carbon atom." Id. at G-2.
33. Id. at G-9.
34. Id. at 567.
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termed 'polymorphic."' 35 These polymorphic genes allow individuals
to be identified through DNA testing.
3 6
B. Protocol for DNA Fingerprinting
There are three types of DNA testing methods used for individual
identification. 7 Neither Maryland's DNA data banking statute38 nor
CODIS39 prescribe a specific type of DNA testing method which
should be used for the DNA analysis. However, Restriction Fragment
Length Polymorphism (RFLP), 40 referred to as DNA fingerprinting,
is the DNA testing technique commonly accepted by the Maryland
courts.
4'
RFLP involves the following steps:
42
35. MacKnight, supra note 2, at 292. "'Polymorphism' refers to different forms
of the same basic structure. There are many examples of polymorphism in
human genetics, such as ABO blood types and eye color." Id. at 292 n.21.
36. James P. O'Brien, Jr., Comment, DNA Fingerprinting: The Virginia Approach,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 767, 770 (1994).
37. MacKnight, supra note 2 (discussing the technology and procedures of (1)
direct gene sequencing or "mapping," (2) Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR),
and (3) Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP)).
Direct gene sequencing "determine[s] the exact nucleotide sequence present
in the DNA molecule of interest[,J" and therefore, direct gene sequencing "can
determine identity with 1000o accuracy." Id. at 293. The nucleotide sequence
is determined by making a cDNA clone from the mRNA. ALBERTS ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 186.
PCR was developed by a California company named Cetus Corporation.
Shapiro & Weinberg, supra note 3, 486 at n.43; Longobardi, supra note 20,
at 357 n.35. "The PCR amplification system simply takes advantage of the
natural DNA replication system and manipulates it to the advantage of the
analyst to produce many millions of DNA copies." MacKnight, supra note 2,
at 304; see also ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 1, at 269.
RFLP is performed commercially by two companies in the United States:
Lifecodes Corporation of Valhalla, New York, and Cellmark Diagnostics of
Germantown, Maryland. Shapiro & Weinberg, supra note 3, at 486 n.7;
Longobardi, supra note 20, at 357 n.35.
38. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, § 12A (1994).
39. See generally Connors, supra note 11, at 857 (mentioning no specific type of
testing procedure which should be utilized).
40. See supra note 37.
41. See, e.g., Keirsey v. State, 106 Md. App. 551, 559-60, 665 A.2d 700, 704
(1995) (stating that "the legislature [and appellate courts in other jurisdictions
have] expressly recognized RFLP as a reliable method of DNA profiling");
Cobey v. State, 80 Md. App. 31, 34-36, 559 A.2d 391, 392-93 (1989) (holding
that DNA fingerprinting is admissible into evidence and is generally accepted
in the scientific community).
42. Cobey, 80 Md. App. at 38-40, 559 A.2d at 395-96; David G. Parks, DNA
Evidence in the Courtroom, 25 LABORATORY MED. 671, 672 (1994); MacKnight,
supra note 2, at 296-97; Longobardi, supra note 20, at 326.
1995]
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Step 1. The nucleated cells are extracted from the biological
sample.4 The cells are chemically broken open, and then the released
DNA is purified."
Step 2. The DNA is cut at specific sites into small fragments of
differing size and molecular weight by restriction endonucleases.45
Step 3. The fragments are separated according to size and weight
by an electro-chemical sorting process called gel electrophoresis.4
Step 4. The two strands of the double-helix fragments are
chemically separated.4 7 "The bases between the strands are unhooked,
leaving the bases on each of the two strands attached." 4 The
traditional analogy is that of a zipper being unzipped.4 9 Therefore,
the double-stranded DNA fragments are denatured 0 to form single
stranded DNA fragments.5'
Step 5. The fragments are transferred from the gel to a sheet
of nitrocellulose or a nylon membrane5 2 and are received in exactly
the same position that they occupied in the gel.
53
Step 6. Radioactively labeled DNA probes54 are washed over the
nitrocellulose sheet."
43. Parks, supra note 42, at 672.
44. Cobey, 80 Md. App. at 38, 559 A.2d at 395; Parks, supra note 42, at 672.
45. Cobey, 80 Md. App. at 38, 559 A.2d at 395; Parks, supra note 42, at 672.
Restriction endonucleases "recognize specific base sequences in double-helical
DNA and cleave both strands of the duplex at specific sites." STRYER, supra
note 24, at 118.
46. Gel electrophoresis is accomplished in the following manner: The DNA sample
is placed in a gel which has a positively charged electric pole attached to one
end and a negatively charged electric pole attached to the other. Parks, supra
note 42, at 672. An electrical current is then run through the gel for an
established period of time. Id. DNA has a natural negative charge, therefore,
as a result of the electrical charge the fragments will move from the end where
the negatively charged pole is located to the end where the positively charged
pole is located. Id. The larger, heavier fragments of DNA move more slowly
and thus a shorter distance as compared to the smaller, lighter fragments. Id.
As a result, the DNA fragments will be orderly arranged along parallel lines.
Id.
47. Cobey, 80 Md. App. at 39, 559 A.2d at 395.
48. Parks, supra note 42, at 672.
49. Cobey, 80 Md. App. at 39, 559 A.2d at 395; Parks, supra note 42, at 672.
50. "When a protein is 'denatured,' it is 'heated or exposed to high pH in order
to separate its strands."' Longobardi, supra note 20, at 357 n.52 (citing White
& Lalouel, Chromosome Mapping with DNA Markers, 258 Sci. AM. 40 (1988)).
51. Parks, supra note 42, at 672.
52. Cobey, 80 Md. App. at 39, 559 A.2d at 395; Parks, supra note 42, at 672.
53. Parks, supra note 42, at 672. This process, in step 5, is known as "Southern
Blotting," named after the researcher who developed the technique. See Cobey,
80 Md. App. at 39, 559 A.2d at 395.
54. These radioactively labelled probes "are designed to seek out a predetermined
locus in a polymorphic (highly variable) region of the DNA. Upon finding a
DNA fragment that carries all or part of its complementary base sequence, the
[Vol. 25
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Step 7. A sheet of x-ray film is placed against the nitrocellulose
sheet, and when the film is processed the radioactive probes show
up as dark bands.1
6
Step 8. The dark bands are then compared against banding
patterns of other test samples.
7
In comparing the banding patterns, the presence of identical
banding patterns in two different samples may indicate that the
samples originated from the same source because, except for identical
twins, "banding patterns are unique to each individual."" However,
these "predictions are statistical expectations based only on proba-
bility." 5 9 Population geneticists use a statistical formula 60 to determine
the probability that two different samples, having identical banding
patterns, originated from the same source.
6'
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF STATE
DNA DATA BANK LEGISLATION-CURRENT CASE LAW
There have been only a handful of cases across the country, in
both the federal and the state courts, that have addressed the con-
stitutionality of DNA data bank statutes. The following sections will
discuss these cases. The cases are categorized by state and are then
listed in chronological order based on the earliest decision challenging
that state's DNA data bank statute.
A. Virginia's DNA Data Bank Statute-Federal Court Decisions
Virginia enacted legislation in 1990 that "established a state
DNA data bank and procedures for the 'collection, analysis and
exchange of DNA information for the purpose of criminal law
enforcement.' 62 The decision of the United States District Court for
probe will bind to the fragments." Cobey, 80 Md. App. at 40, 559 A.2d at
395-96.
55. This process is called hybridization. Id. at 39, 559 A.2d at 395.
56. The x-ray photograph is called an autoradiograph. Parks, supra note 42, at
672.
57. MacKnight, supra note 2, at 297.
58. Longobardi, supra note 20, at 330.
59. Id. at n.59 (emphasis omitted) (citing J. BAKER & G. ALLEN, THE STUDY OF
BIOLOGY 452 (4th ed. 1982)).
60. This statistical formula is known as the Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium. Id. at
330-31. "The Hardy-Weinberg principle is expressed algebraicly as
P2 + 2PQ + Q2 = 1, where P and Q are the percentage of the population having
two different [alternative forms of a gene, for example, the percentage of the
population having brown hair]." People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 993
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
61. Longobardi, supra note 20, at 330-31 & n.66.
62. O'Brien, supra note 36, at 796 (quoting Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 304
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 472 (1992)); see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-
310.2 to -310.7 (Michie 1990).
19951
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the Western District of Virginia in Jones v. Murray3 was the first
decision in the nation upholding a DNA data bank statute. 64
In Jones, inmates brought a § 1983 action challenging the
constitutionality of Virginia's statute,65 which required that convicted
felons provide a blood sample for DNA analysis." Plaintiffs asserted
that the statute violated four distinct constitutional rights. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiffs argued: (1) that their Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when their
blood was taken and analyzed, 67 (2) that their Fourth Amendment
right to privacy was violated by the statute," (3) that the statute
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause for those plaintiffs convicted prior
to the effective date of the statute, 69 and (4) that, because the blood
test constituted a condition of parole, the statute interfered with the
vested liberty interest of mandatory parole for those plaintiffs who
were convicted prior to the statute's effective date.
70
The district court began its analysis of the plaintiffs' right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures by acknowledging that
the Fourth Amendment71 protected individuals against unreasonable
searches and seizures72 and that blood tests constituted searches within
the Fourth Amendment.73 The court noted that although a warrant
issued upon probable cause is generally the measure of a reasonable
search,74 there are "special needs, beyond the normal needs of law
enforcement [which] make the warrant and probable-cause require-
ment impracticable. ' 75 The court cited several Supreme Court cases
in an attempt to explain the "special needs" exception. 76 However,
63. Jones v. Murray, 763 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Va. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 472 (1992).
64. Judge Holds Virginia's DNA Databank Proposal Constitutional, U.S. NEWS-
wiE, Mar. 4, 1991.
65. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-310.2 to -310.7 (Michie 1990).
66. Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 843.




71. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
72. Jones v. Murray, 763 F. Supp. 842, 844 (W.D. Va. 1991) (citing United States
v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985)).
73. Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
74. Id. (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)).
75. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)).
76. Id. (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709 (1987); New Jersey ,. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
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[n]o clear test defines the "special needs" exception; ...
an analysis of.. .Supreme Court cases [which have invoked
the exception] reveals that four themes are discernible, al-
though often difficult to apply: (1) the search facilitates the
administrative operation of the agency; (2) the officials
conducting the search lack the training to be able to deter-
mine probable cause; (3) the object of the search has a
diminished privacy expectation; and (4) the circumstances
surrounding the search create enhanced governmental inter-
ests.
7
Furthermore, the court noted that individualized suspicion was not
an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circum-
stance. 7 The district court explained: "In limited circumstances,
where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and
where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion
would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement [of] individualizing
suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such
suspicion." ' 79 Accordingly, the district court concluded that it was
appropriate to apply a balancing test. 0
The test used by the district court weighed the state's interests,
or special needs beyond normal law enforcement, against the general
privacy right of a person to be free from unjustified government
intrusion.8' In the state's favor, the district court found that the
Commonwealth of Virginia had a compelling interest in using the
DNA data bank for detecting and deterring recidivist acts. 2 Fur-
thermore, the court found a "close and substantial relation" between
DNA testing and the state's "goal of detecting suspects and deterring
recidivism by convicted felons." 3
The district court held that the Commonwealth of Virginia's
interests outweighed the privacy interests of the plaintiffs for three
reasons.84 First, the court indicated that the extraction of blood
involved a minimal degree of intrusion.8 5 Second, the court stated
77. Michael S. Vaughn & Rolando V. del Carmen, "Special Needs" in Criminal
Justice: An Evolving Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant and Prob-
able Cause Requirements, 3 GEo. MASON U. CIrv. RTS. L.J. 203, 210 (1993).
78. Jones v. Murray, 763 F. Supp. 842, 845 (W.D. Va. 1991) (citing Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989)).
79. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
80. Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 845-48.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 846-47.
83. Id. at 847 (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 676 (1989)).
84. Id. at 847-48.
85. Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).
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that an "individual ha[d] no [c]onstitutional right to privacy in his
identity, ' 8 6 and, thus, "[tjo the extent that the DNA analysis re-
veal[ed] identification characteristics only, plaintiffs d[id] not indicate
a legitimate expectation of privacy." 87 Third, the court pointed out
that convicted persons have limited privacy rights. 88 For example, the
Supreme Court has held that prisoners are required to submit to
searches of their cellblocks and their body cavities. 9 Hence, the court
held that the statute "d[id] not violate plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment
rights because plaintiffs' limited interest in withholding a blood
sample [wa]s outweighed by the substantial [s]tate interest in deterring
and detecting recidivist acts." ' 9
The district court summarily rejected the plaintiffs' second chal-
lenge-that their Fourth Amendment right to privacy was violated.
Relying upon its discussion of the plaintiffs' privacy rights in the
earlier Fourth Amendment challenge, the district court concluded
that the Commonwealth did not violate the plaintiffs' right to privacy
by analyzing a convicted felon's blood sample and storing the profile
in a data bank. 9'
The district court also rejected the plaintiffs' third challenge. 92
Although Virginia's DNA data bank statute did not become effective
until July 1, 1990, prisoners who were convicted before this date
were required to provide a blood sample before they could be released
from prison. 93 The plaintiffs argued that this requirement violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause94 of Article I of the United States Consti-
tution. 95 The district court explained that the blood sample was merely
taken for the procedural purpose of establishing the DNA bank and
not to punish convicted felons for their past crimes. 96 Because an Ex
86. Id. at 848.
87. Id. at 847.
88. Id. at 848.
89. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (holding that an inmate had
no expectation of privacy in his prison cell entitling him to protection under
the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520 (1979) (holding that body cavity searches of pretrial detainees did not
violate the Fourth Amendment).
90. Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 851.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 850.
93. Id. at 849.
94. "A statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if the law alters the legal
consequences of acts occurring before its enactment to the disadvantage of the
offender affected by it." Id. at 849 (citing Calder v. Bull, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798)).
95. "Neither Congress nor any state shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law
. " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429
(1987) (citing the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution and discussing the
Ex Post Facto prohibition).
96. Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 850.
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Post Facto violation does not occur "if the change in the law is
merely procedural and does not increase the punishment," the court
held that the statute did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
97
Finally, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' fourth argument-
that providing a blood sample constituted a condition for parole
eligibility. 98 The court held that the statute could be read in a manner
"so as not to violate plaintiffs' liberty interests." 99 Therefore, inas-
much as a convicted felon's release date implicates a protected liberty
interest, a "prisoner must be given some process before he is held
beyond his established parole release date.' 1°
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, the appellants argued that the district court erred in holding
that the statute: (1) did not violate the Fourth Amendment' 0' and (2)
did not violate the constitutional prohibition against Ex Post Facto
laws. 02 The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district
court except to the extent that the statute could be enforced to
modify mandatory parole conditions. 03
Interestingly, with respect to the district court's inquiry of the
Fourth Amendment claim, the majority of the court of appeals
declined to address the "special needs" analysis. 1 4 Instead, the court
of appeals concluded that convicted prisoners and probationers "lose
a right of privacy from routine searches . . . . 10 Therefore, the
reviewing court weighed the Commonwealth's law enforcement in-
terest in ascertaining the identifying characteristics of persons who
commit crimes against the limited privacy interests of convicted felons
and the minor intrusion caused by taking a blood sample.' °6 The
court concluded that the Commonwealth's interest outweighed the
convicted felons' interest and, thus, that the data bank statute did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.
10 7
97. Id. (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 851.
100. Id.
101. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 303 (4th Cir. 1992).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 303, 310-11.
104. Id. at 306-07 n.2.
105. Id. at 306. The court of appeals made this assertion relying on the Supreme
Court's decisions in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) (determining
that probationers had a limited right of privacy against searches of their homes
pursuant to a program to ensure rehabilitation and safety), Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (holding that inmate had no expectation of privacy
in his prison cell entitling him to protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment), and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
559-60 (1979) (holding that body cavity searches of pretrial detainees did not
violate the Fourth Amendment).
106, Jones, 962 F.2d at 307.
107. Id. at 307-08.
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In a concurring opinion, Judge Murnaghan noted that the "ap-
pellants ha[d] not forfeited their expectation of privacy with respect
to blood testing."10 Notwithstanding a prisoner's expectation of
privacy, Judge Murnaghan stated: "DNA testing procedure[s] ...
may be justified"' 0 9 by a reasonable application of the balancing
test, which weighs the "privacy interest involved against the state
interest in the search."" 0
Next, the court of appeals addressed the plaintiffs' claim that
the statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause."' The court of appeals
agreed with the district court's finding that DNA testing is not penal
in nature."' Furthermore, relying on the Supreme Court's decision
in Warden v. Marrero,"3 the court stated that "violators c[ould] be
administratively punished for failure to provide samples."1' 4 The
court of appeals, however, indicated that the first five words of the
statute" 5 authorized a modification of mandatory parole and, thus,
this statute violated the prohibition against Ex Post Facto laws."
6
The court of appeals concluded that the DNA data bank statute
108. Id. at 312 (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 313.
110. "Justification . .. must be based ... on a balancing of the privacy interest
involved against the state interest in the search to determine which interest is
more compelling." Id. at 313 (citing Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444 (1990)).
111. Jones, 962 F.2d at 309-10.
112. Id. at 309.
113. 417 U.S. 653, 661-64 (1974) (holding that a repeal of parole eligibility imposed
greater punishment than was prescribed by law at the time of the offense).
114. Jones, 962 F.2d at 310. For example, inmates may be denied "good-time"
credits. Id.
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that prison regulations reducing good conduct time credits for inmates refusing
to provide blood samples for the DNA information bank violated neither the
Ex Post Facto Clause nor the prisoners' due process rights, even assuming that
the good conduct time credit system had created a protected liberty interest.
Ewell v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2112
(1994).
115. "Notwithstanding the provisions of 53.1-159 [the mandatory release on parole
requirement], any person convicted of a felony who is in custody after July 1,
1990, shall provide a blood sample prior to his release." VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-310.2 (emphasis added).
116. Jones, 962 F.2d at 310-11. The Fourth Circuit later re-affirmed its holding
that Virginia's DNA data bank statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause "to
the extent section 19.2-310.2 purport(edl to allow prison officials to hold an
inmate beyond the mandatory parole date." Al-Wahhab v. Murray, No. 91-
7145, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 27500, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 16, 1992); see also
Carey v. City of Richmond, No. 91-7337, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17864, at
*2 (4th Cir. July 30, 1992) (holding that "Virginia's DNA data bank regulations
create an Ex Post Facto problem when used to delay an inmate's release
beyond his mandatory parole release date").
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could be upheld merely by eliminating the Ex Post Facto sanction." 7
B. Minnesota's DNA Data Bank Statute-State Court Decision
Minnesota enacted DNA analysis and data banking legislation
in 1989.118 The statute required an individual convicted of a sexual
offense to provide a blood sample to the Minnesota Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension (BCA)." 9 The statute required BCA to adopt
procedures for collecting, maintaining and analyzing the samples. As
of 1991, however, the BCA had not yet adopted any protocols,
20
and blood samples were merely being stored until such time as these
procedures could be adopted. 2 '
The Minnesota statute was challenged, in In re Z.P.B. ,122 by a
fifteen-year-old boy 23 who had been convicted of a sexual offense
and who was ordered to submit a biological specimen for DNA
analysis. 24 The appellant argued that the DNA analysis statute vio-
lated his constitutional right to due process of law because uniform
procedures for maintaining or analyzing the specimen had not been
adopted.' 25 In rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeals of
Minnesota concluded that:
Absent an actual attempt to use a specimen for some
purpose, there can be no justiciable controversy regarding
the adequacy of procedures and protocols employed when
using the specimen for that purpose. The only direct and
117. Jones, 962 F.2d at 311.
118. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 299C.155, 609.3461 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994); see
McEwen & Reilly, supra note 6, at 943 (citing Minnesota's DNA data bank
statute and generally discussing DNA data bank legislation).
119. In re Z.P.B., 474 N.W.2d 651, 652 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 474 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
123. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals of Arizona, in In re Appeal in Maricopa
County, Nos. 1 CA-JV 94-0063, 1 CA-JV 94-0081 and 1 CA-JV 95-0010, 901
P.2d 1205 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995), held that "the juvenile court has neither
express nor inherent authority to order a juvenile delinquent into the Arizona
DNA Identification System." Id. at 1206-07. The court found that the "statutes
for the Arizona DNA Identification System ... apply only to persons who
have been convicted of a sexual offense." Id. at 1207-08. "A juvenile delinquent
is not such a person [because Arizona Statute] § 8-207(A) (1989) provides that
adjudication of delinquency 'shall not be deemed a conviction."' Id. The court
of appeals indicated that the courts could not expand the Arizona DNA
Identification System statutes because they were criminal code statutes. Id. at
1208. "Whether to include delinquent children in [the Arizona DNA Identifi-
cation] [Slystem is for the legislature to decide .... " Id.
124. In re Z.P.B., 474 N.W.2d at 652.
125. Id. at 653.
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imminent injury that will result from the trial court order
requiring appellant to provide a biological sample for DNA
analysis is the intrusion that occurs when the required blood
sample is withdrawn without appellant's consent. This lim-
ited intrusion does not violate appellant's due process rights.'
26
Accordingly, the court held that the requirement to provide a bio-
logical specimen for DNA analysis did not violate the appellant's
constitutional right to due process of law.
27
C. Washington's DNA Data Bank Statute-State Court Decision
In 1989, the State of Washington enacted legislation that, as of
July 1, 1990, would require any individual convicted of a sex offense
or of a crime of violence to submit a blood sample for DNA
identification analysis. 2 ' Among other things, a violent offense could
include vehicular homicide caused by drunk or reckless driving.129 In
State v. Olivas,'30 seven convicted felons challenged court orders that
required each of them to provide a blood sample for DNA purposes
pursuant to Washington's DNA analysis statute.' Appellants raised
three constitutional issues: (1) that the drawing of blood for DNA
purposes constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment,3 2 (2) that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague, which violated Appellants' right to due process under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,' 33 and (3) that the statute violated
the appellants' right to equal protection of the laws under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
3 4
The Supreme Court of Washington began its analysis by dis-
cussing the search and seizure issue as it had developed in cases such
as Schmerber v. California'35 and Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives' Ass'n. 3 6 In Schmerber, the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether the warrantless extraction of blood in
order to determine alcoholic content was an unconstitutional search
126. Id. at 654.
127. Id.
128. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754 (West Supp. 1994); see McEwen & Reilly, supra
note 6, at 943 (citing Washington's DNA data bank statute and generally
discussing DNA data bank legislation).
129. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.030(36) (West Supp. 1995).
130. 856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
131. Id. at 1077-80.
132. Id. at 1080.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
136. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.' 37 The Court held that
the extraction of blood constituted a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment. 3 Further, the Court held that a warrant was
not required for this type of search; an exigency, or emergency
situation, existed because blood-alcohol content could diminish
quickly.3 9
In Skinner, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
federal regulation that required railroad employees to submit to
breath and urine testing for drug and alcohol use, although there
was no individualized suspicion.14° The Court held that such tests
were "searches" under the Fourth Amendment 14' but that the gov-
ernment's strong and compelling interest in regulating the conduct
of railroad employees in order to ensure public safety presented
"special needs beyond law enforcement" justifying a departure from
the ordinary warrant and probable cause requirements for a search. 42
In Olivas, the State of Washington relied upon Schmerber and
argued that the extraction of blood was conducted incident to the
petitioner's arrest. 43 The Supreme Court of Washington rejected this
argument because the blood samples in the instant cases were "used
solely for DNA identification of offenders after conviction and would
not be considered 'incident to arrest' under [Schmerber]."'4 Instead,
the majority of the court adopted the approach taken by the Supreme
Court in Skinner'45 and in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab'4 as well as the approach utilized by the United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia in Jones v.
Murray. 47 These approaches "affirmed general privacy rights by
requiring 'special needs beyond normal law enforcement' for drawing
blood from convicted persons without probable cause or individual-
ized suspicion." 4
In Olivas, with respect to the search and seizure issue a concur-
ring judge argued: .'[S]pecial needs' is only relevant where the
[s]tate's need is beyond that of ordinary law enforcement, [thus] it
137. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 766-72.
138. Id. at 767-70.
139. Id. at 770-72.
140. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.
141. Id. at 616-17.
142. Id. at 619-33.
143. State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1083 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (quoting Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).
144. Id. at 1084.
145. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
146. 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding the Custom Service's drug testing program by
applying the "special needs" exception).
147. 763 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Va. 1991).
148. State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1086 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
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is not applicable to these cases."' 14 9 The concurring judge concluded
that the DNA testing statute should be "analyzed under traditional
principles of Fourth Amendment law"' 50 and opined that the extrac-
tion of blood and subsequent DNA testing for identification purposes
was minimally intrusive and was, therefore, an exception to the
general warrant and the probable cause requirements.'
Appellants also argued that the statute violated their right to
due process of law because it was unconstitutionally vague on its
face with respect to the procedure used in drawing their blood.
5 2
The appellants had the burden of establishing that the DNA testing
statute was unconstitutionally vague beyond a reasonable doubt in
order to have it struck down.'53 The court concluded that the appel-
lants failed to meet this burden.
5 4
Finally, the appellants claimed that the statute, which only
applied to individuals who had committed sex offenses or violent
offenses, violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal pro-
tection of the laws.'55 Under an equal protection challenge, one of
three levels of scrutiny is utilized: (1) When a fundamental right or
a suspect class is involved, the court will apply a strict scrutiny
standard; 5 6 (2) when a semi-suspect class is involved, the court will
apply an intermediate level of scrutiny; 5 7 and (3) when none of these
149. Id. at 1090 (Utter, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 1091. For example, the statute should be analyzed under the minimally
intrusive search exception to the general warrant and probable cause require-
ments. Id. at 1091-92.
151. Id. at 1094.
152. Id. at 1086.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1086-87.
155. Id. at 1087.
156. Id. If strict scrutiny is applied to a particular law, the law will only be upheld
if it is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly
tailored to achieve that end. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886) (indicating that a classification based on race is the classic example of
a suspect classification and invoking strict scrutiny); Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding any governmental action that is explicitly
race-based must be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (applying the strict
scrutiny standard because the right to vote is a fundamental right).
157. Olivas, 856 P.2d at 1087. The intermediate level of scrutiny requires that the
semi-suspect classification be substantially related to important governmental
objectives. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (articulating the
applicable standard as being that semi-suspect classifications "must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives"). Classifications based on sex, alienage and illegiti-
macy are considered semi-suspect classes which require the use of mid-level
scrutiny. See, e.g., id. (holding that gender based classifications warrant an
intermediate level of scrutiny); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (applying
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rights or classes are involved, the court will apply a rational rela-
tionship standard.5 8 The court determined that because neither a
fundamental liberty interest nor a suspect class was involved, the
correct standard of scrutiny was the rational basis standard. 5 9 Sub-
sequently, the court found a rational relationship between "the
interest of the government in law enforcement,"I 16 which was to
investigate and prosecute sex offenses and violent offenses, and "the
application of the statute to this class of persons.' ' 6' Thus, the court
held that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
162
D. Illinois's DNA Data Bank Statute-State Court Decision
In 1989, the Illinois legislature enacted a statute that required
convicted sex offenders to submit blood and saliva specimens for
DNA analysis. 63 In People v. Wealer,'64 the defendant appealed an
the intermediate level of scrutiny to a statute which allowed school districts to
deny free public education to illegal-alien children); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S.
456 (1988) (applying the intermediate level of review for classifications disad-
vantaging illegitimates).
158. Olivas, 856 P.2d at 1087. The standard for the lowest level of review is that
the statute will not be stricken if it is conceivable that there is some rational
relation between the means selected by the legislature and a legitimate legislative
objective. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166
(1980) (holding that the legitimate purpose advanced by the statute's defender
was rationally related to the classification).




163. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, par. 1005-4-3 (1991); see also People v. Wealer, 636
N.E.2d 1129 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (quoting portions of the Illinois DNA testing
statute); McEwen & Reilly, supra note 6, at 943 (citing Illinois's DNA data
bank statute and generally discussing DNA data bank legislation).
164. 636 N.E.2d 1129 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). The Illinois DNA data bank statute was
also challenged in Gilbert v. Peters, Nos. 93 C 20012, 92 C 20354, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9215 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 1994). In Gilbert, prison inmates claimed
that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at *2, *4.
The district court rejected the Fourth Amendment challenge by employing a
modification of the Fourth Circuit's approach in Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d
302 (4th Cir. 1992). Id. at *14 & n.5. Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the district
court did not rely upon the theory that prisoners possessed a lesser expectation
of privacy. Instead, it focused on the minimal intrusion imposed by DNA
testing. Id. at n.5. In addition, the court held that the statute did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause because a rational relationship between the interest
of the government in law enforcement and application of the statute to this
class of persons existed. Id. at *25. The court also rejected the Ex Post Facto
challenge, noting that the Illinois statute did not contain language like the
Virginia DNA databank statute. Id. at **30-31. Rather, the language in the
Illinois statute was ambiguous and, therefore, may be interpreted by the court
as not violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at **31-32.
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order of the trial court, which required the taking of blood and
saliva samples pursuant to the DNA testing statute,' 65 and asserted
that the statute violated his right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.' 66 After a complete analysis of the development
of search and seizure case law, as well as a careful review of the
current DNA data banking case law, the Appellate Court of Illinois
adopted the traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test. 67 "Under
this [traditional] approach, a reviewing court may balance the gov-
ernment's interest in conducting the search, the degree to which the
search actually advances that interest, and the gravity of the intrusion
upon personal privacy to determine whether the search is reasona-
ble."'"
68
The court determined that the statute's testing procedures im-
posed minimal physical intrusion.' 69 In addition, the court held:
"[Tihe privacy interest that a convicted sex offender has in his or
her identity is minimal."' 70 As a result, the court balanced the state's
closely related legitimate interest in deterring and prosecuting recid-
ivist acts committed by sex offenders against the minimal physical
intrusion imposed upon the convicted sex offender, who possessed a
diminished privacy interest in his identity.' 7' The court held that the
statute did not violate the prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures because the government's interest outweighed the defen-
dant's personal privacy right.'
72
E. Oregon's DNA Data Bank Statute-State and Federal Court
Decisions
In 1991, the State of Oregon enacted legislation that required
persons convicted of murder, any sexual offense or any conspiracy
or attempt to commit a sexual offense to submit a blood sample to
the Department of Corrections. 173 In State v. Orozco, 174 the appellants
challenged a court order that required a child to provide a blood
sample for DNA testing pursuant to the DNA data bank statutes.' 75
165. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d at 1130.
166. Id.
167. The traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test approach was articulated in
the concurring opinions of Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d at 311-13 (Murnaghan,
J., concurring) and State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d at 1089-94 (Utter, J., concurring).
168. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d at 1135.
169. Id. at 1136.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1135-37.
172. Id. at 1137.
173. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 137.076, 161.325(4), 181.085 (1994).
174. 878 P.2d 432 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (en banc).
175. Id. at 433-34.
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Appellants' challenges were based on state grounds as well as on the
Fourth Amendment.
76
In analyzing the Fourth Amendment challenge, the court rec-
ognized that a warrant was not necessary in certain limited circum-
stances when the search and seizure involved only a minimal
intrusion.' In addition, the court recognized the minimally intrusive
quality of blood extraction. 7 The court then applied the traditional
balancing test set forth in Brown v. Texas, 79 which is used to
determine whether the search and seizure is reasonable when the
intrusion is minimal.8 0 The court found that the prosecution of
sexual offenses was an important government interest and that the
taking of blood samples for a DNA data bank of sexual offenders
directly furthered this government interest.' 8' According to the court,
this important and rationally related government interest outweighed
the minimal intrusion upon personal privacy and, therefore, the court
held that the DNA data bank statutes did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.8 2 Neither the concurrence'83 nor the dissent'84 directly
addressed the Fourth Amendment challenge.
Oregon's DNA data banking laws' 85 were also challenged in Rise
v. Oregon.8 6 In Rise, the crux of the appellants' argument, in a §
1983 action, was that the collection of blood samples pursuant to
the DNA data bank laws violated the Fourth Amendment and the
Ex Post Facto Clause.1
8 7
The district court found that the collection of blood under the
DNA data banking laws did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because "it served a 'special need' other than normal law enforcement
and was related to effective penal administration."'818 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision on this issue but on slightly different grounds. 8 9 The
court indicated that it found the laws to be constitutional even if
their only objective was for law enforcement.19°
176. Id. at 434-36.
177. Id. at 435-36.
178. Id. at 436 (citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985)).
179. 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
180. State v. Orozco, 878 P.2d 432, 435-36 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (en banc).
181. Id. at 436.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 436-39 (Rossman, Edmonds, & De Muniz, J.J., concurring).
184. Id. at 439-42 (Haselton, & Leeson, J.J., dissenting).
185. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 137.076, 161.325(4), 181.085 (1994).
186. 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995).
187. Id. at 1556.





The court of appeals acknowledged that the collection of blood
samples implicated the Fourth Amendment' 9' and that the Fourth
Amendment only allowed for reasonable searches and seizures. 92 The
court also recognized that reasonableness "generally depend[ed] on
whether the search was made pursuant to a warrant issued upon
probable cause."' 193 The court stated, however, that "the [s]tate
[could] interfere with an individual's Fourth Amendment interests
with less than probable cause and without a warrant if the intrusion
[wa]s only minimal and [wa]s justified by law enforcement pur-
poses.' ' 194 The court determined, based upon the traditional finger-
printing analogy, that the intrusion upon a convicted felon's privacy
was minimal. 195 Further, relying upon Skinner, 196 the court determined
that the intrusion upon the convicted felon's physical integrity was
also minimal. 97 In addition, the court explained that the state pro-
vided evidence that a DNA data bank would deter recidivism and
would help the state to identify and to prosecute accurately the
perpetrators of future offenses.198 After balancing the minimal intru-
sion upon the convicted felon's privacy interests and physical integrity
against the state's incontestable interest in preventing recidivism and
in identifying and prosecuting such felons, the court held that the
Fourth Amendment was not violated.' 99 The court decided the Fourth
Amendment issue by applying the balancing approach that utilized
more traditional principles regarding the Fourth Amendment as op-
posed to the balancing test used by the district court, which included
the "special needs" exception.
The appellants in Rise were convicted prior to the enactment of
Oregon's DNA data bank laws. 200 Therefore, the appellants argued
that the collection of blood samples from them violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause. 20 1 The court determined that the DNA data bank laws
could raise Ex Post Facto concerns only if the laws subjected appel-
lants to increased punishment. 20 2 "[L]egislation may lawfully impose
191. Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1558-59 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) and Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)).
192. Id. at 1559 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
619 (1989)).
193. Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983)).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989).
197. Rise, 59 F.3d at 1559.
198. Id. at 1561.
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new requirements on convicted persons if the statute's 'overall design
and effect' indicates a 'non-punitive intent.' 23 The court then held
that the DNA data bank laws did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause because the purpose of the DNA data bank laws was to assist
in the identification and accurate prosecution of criminals and not
to punish convicted murderers or sexual offenders. 20
4
Judge Nelson strenuously dissented from the majority's hold-
ing-that the collection of blood from a convicted murderer or sexual
offender without a warrant or individualized suspicion, in order to
create a DNA data bank, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 205
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Nelson disputed the majority's
conclusion that Schmerber v. California206 broadly stood for the
premise that forced blood extraction was a de minimis concern. 2°7
Rather, Judge Nelson argued that Schmerber stood for the premise
that the non-consensual taking of blood without a warrant was
permissible only when law enforcement faced an exigent circumstance
and not for the creation of a DNA data bank.208
The dissent also argued that the "special needs beyond normal
law enforcement" rationale could not be relied upon because it only
applied to regulatory contexts where apprehension of criminals was
not involved. 209 Further, unless the case involved voluntary partici-
pants in a highly regulated context, the "special needs" approach
almost always required individualized suspicion. 210 Additionally, the
dissenting judge claimed that the majority could not rely on the fact
that prison inmates lost those individual privacy rights that served
penological needs because the DNA data bank statute had nothing
to do with prison administration. 21 ' The dissent concluded: "[T]he
majority has sacrificed a precious constitutional protection[-the
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures-]in the name of greater police efficiency .... ,212
F. North Carolina's DNA Data Bank Statute-Federal Court
Decision
In 1993, the North Carolina General Assembly passed legislation
that established a DNA data bank. 213 In the 1994 case of Sanders v.
203. Id. (citing United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1993)).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1564-71 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
206. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
207. Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1564 (9th Cir. 1995) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1567.
210. Id. at 1567-68.
211. Id. at 1568-69.
212. Id. at 1571.
213. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-266 to -270 (1994).
19951
Baltimore Law Review
Coman,214 several inmates brought a § 1983 action seeking protection
from the North Carolina DNA data bank statutes, which required
that the inmates submit blood samples. 215 Plaintiffs argued: (1) that
the collection of blood samples in accordance with the DNA data
bank statutes violated the Fourth Amendment, which requires a
finding of probable cause or of individualized suspicion in order for
the search and seizure to be considered reasonable, 2 6 and (2) that
the DNA data bank statutes, and the use of force authorized there-
under, violated their Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and
unusual punishment.
217
Relying on Jones v. Murray, 18 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit quickly dismissed the plaintiffs'
Fourth Amendment claim. 2 9 The court indicated that it was bound
by the Jones decision, which held that extracting a blood sample in
compliance with Virginia's DNA data bank statute did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.
220
The court then addressed the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment cruel
and unusual punishment challenge. "[In order to violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, the force
challenged must have been used for the purpose of causing harm."
' 221
The court held that there was not enough evidence to support the
idea that the force used to obtain the blood samples for the DNA
data bank was applied with the intention of causing the inmates
harm. 222 The court also stated that correctional officers may use
reasonable force under the circumstances in order to effectuate
compliance with the statute. 223 Again, the court explained that there
was no evidence to indicate that the correctional officers conducted
themselves in a manner which displayed an extraordinary lack of due
care for the inmates' interest or safety. 224 Therefore, the court found
no violation of the Eighth Amendment. 225
G. Kansas's DNA Data Bank Statute-Federal Court Decision
Kansas's DNA data bank statute, enacted in 1991, requires
individuals who have been convicted of murder, or of certain sex
214. 864 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 498.
217. Id.
218. 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
219. Sanders, 864 F. Supp. at 499.
220. Id. at 499.
221. Id. at 500.
222. Id. at 501.
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offenses, to submit a blood sample for DNA analysis. 226 The consti-
tutionality of this statute was challenged in Vanderfinden v. State.227
In Vanderfinden, the plaintiffs argued that the statute was unconsti-
tutional because: (1) the statute violated the Fourth Amendment; (2)
the statute infringed on an inmate's privacy interest; (3) the statute
violated the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unu-
sual punishment; (4) the statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause;
(5) the statute was the equivalent of a Bill of Attainder; and (6) the
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause.
22
With regard to the Fourth Amendment challenge, the court
recognized that blood tests were searches229 and, therefore, turned its
attention to whether or not such searches were reasonable. 210 The
court relied upon the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in Jones
v. Murray.23' In Jones, the Fourth Circuit held that convicted persons
had a lesser expectation of privacy with respect to routine searches. 232
Thus, in Jones, the Commonwealth of Virginia's interest in law
enforcement outweighed the limited privacy interests of the convicted
individual. 23  In Vanderlinden, the court similarly held that the search
was not unreasonable and, therefore, that it did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.
234
The court then analyzed the plaintiffs' claim that the statute
infringed upon their privacy interest. The court broadly asserted: "In
or out of prison, [a] plaintiff has only a limited privacy interest in
not having his blood tested. ' 235 Further, the court held that the
government's compelling interest in law enforcement outweighed the
limited privacy interests of a convicted individual.
236
The court's resolution of the issue of whether the DNA data
bank statute imposed cruel and unusual punishment turned upon the
226. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511 (Supp. 1994).
227. 874 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Kan. 1995).
228. Id. at 1213. Plaintiffs also alleged that "their right to procedural due process
ha[d] been violated by threats that upon refusal to comply with the blood
draw required by the statute, an inmate wfould] be summarily placed in
restraints, subjected to the involuntary extraction of blood, and placed in
segregation for an indefinite period." Id. at 1215-16. The court found no
violation in procedural due process rights because "the bare threat of placement
in segregation did not impair a protected liberty interest and [because], given
the court's approval of the testing itself, a hearing could not benefit an inmate
in the absence of a viable question of law or fact." Id. at 1216.
229. Id. at 1214 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).
230. Id.
231. 962 F.2d 302, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1992).
232. Id. at 306.
233. Id. at 307-08.
234. Vanderlinden, 874 F. Supp. at 1215.




finding of whether the statute imposed punishment. 237 The court
recognized that the DNA data bank was established for law enforce-
ment purposes238 and, therefore, the court held that the statute was
not penal.239 Further, the court noted that the plaintiffs failed to
show that any force used to enforce the statute was "malicious or
grossly disproportionate to the refusal to comply with the statutory
mandate. ' ' 240 Accordingly, the court held that the DNA data bank
statute did not impose cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.
24'
In addressing the plaintiffs' Ex Post Facto claim, the court noted
that the Ex Post Facto Clause "applie[d] only to penal statutes which
disadvantage the offender affected by them. ' 242 Because the court
had previously held that the DNA data bank statute was not penal,
it concluded that the statute did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause.243 Likewise, the court summarily rejected the plaintiffs' claim
that the statute had to be invalidated as an unconstitutional Bill of
Attainder2" because the statute had already been found not to impose
punishment. 245
Finally, the court addressed the plaintiffs' sixth argument-that
the statute denied persons convicted of certain crimes equal protection
of the laws without possessing a compelling state interest. 2" The
court chose to apply a strict scrutiny standard 247 to the DNA data
bank statute because it involved the fundamental right of privacy. 248
In order to uphold a statute under strict scrutiny, a court must find
a compelling governmental interest, and the statute must be narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest.249 The court noted that the purpose




237. Id. at 1216.
238. Id. at 1210 (indicating the purpose of the statute is "to detect and deter
commission of crimes by recidivists").
239. Id. at 1216.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990), quoted in Vanderlinden v.
State, 874 F. Supp. 1210, 1216 (1995).
243. Id.
244. "A bill of attainder is 'a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts
punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections
of a jury trial."' Vanderlinden, 847 F. Supp. at 1216-17 (quoting Nixon v.
Administrator, 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977)).
245. Id. at 1216.
246. Id.
247. "[S]trict scrutiny applies where a fundamental right, such as privacy, marriage,
voting, or suspect classification . . . is implicated." Id. at 1217.
248. Id.
249. Id.; see supra note 156.
250. Vanderlinden, 874 F. Supp. at 1217.
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Furthermore, the court found that the statute was narrowly drawn
to achieve that purpose because the statute concentrated on the group
of convicted individuals that was "most likely .. . to commit the
type of crime in which DNA may be left." ' 25'
IV. MARYLAND'S DNA DATA BASE SYSTEM AND
REPOSITORY-A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The Maryland General Assembly recently enacted legislation (the
Act), which became effective October 1, 1994, that created a statewide
DNA data base system and repository. 2 2 The statute provides, in
pertinent part:
(a) Definitions. - (1) In this section the following words
have the following meanings indicated.
(7) "DNA sample" means a bodily fluid or tissue sample
provided by any person convicted of a qualifying crime of
violence or any body fluid or tissue sample submitted to
the statewide DNA data base system for analysis pursuant
to a criminal investigation.
(8) "Qualifying crime of violence" means:
(i) A violation of Article 27, § 35A of the Code that
involves sexual abuse;
(ii) Rape in any degree; or
(iii) A sexual offense in the first, second, or third degree.
(c) Collection of DNA. - ... a person convicted of a
qualifying crime of violence shall:
(1) Have a DNA sample collected upon intake to any
prison or detention facility; or
(2) If not sentenced to a term of imprisonment, be ordered
by the court to provide a DNA sample as a condition of
sentence.
(d) Retroactive collection. - A person who has been con-
victed of a qualifying crime of violence [a sexual offense]
prior to October 1, 1994 and who remains incarcerated on
that date shall submit a DNA sample to the Department of
Public Safety and Correctional Services.
(e) Purpose of testing. - (1) ...DNA samples shall be
tested for the following purposes:
(i) To analyze and type the genetic markers contained in
or derived from DNA samples;
251. Id.
252. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, § 12A (1995).
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(ii) In the furtherance of an official investigation into a
criminal offense;
(iii) To assist in the identification of human remains;
(iv) To assist in the identification of missing persons; and
(v) For research and administrative purposes, including
1. Development of a population data base after personal
identifying information is removed;
2. Support of identification research and protocol devel-
opment of forensic DNA analysis methods; and
3. Quality control purposes.
(2)(i) Only DNA records that directly relate to the identi-
fication of individuals shall be collected and stored.
(ii) These records may not be used for any purposes other
than those specified in this section.
253
As indicated by the cases in other jurisdictions, Maryland's DNA
Data Base System and Repository legislation may be susceptible to
a variety of constitutional challenges.
254
253. Id.
254. In addition to the challenges discussed in the text of this Comment, Maryland's
DNA data banking statute may be susceptible to challenges under (1) the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and (2) the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination. The success of these challenges, however,
appear very unlikely.
(1) First Amendment-Freedom of Religion
The first determination that must be made when a statute is challenged
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is whether or not the
statute is "neutral and of general applicability." Ryncarz v. Eikenberry, 824
F. Supp. 1493, 1502 (E.D. Wash. 1993) (referring to Employment Div. Dept.
of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). If the statute is generally
applied and neutral towards imposing a burden on religion, a compelling state
interest is not required. Id. However, if it is not, the statute must first be
evaluated according to several factors in order to be justified by a compelling
state interest. Id.
The factors the court would then consider to determine if the burden is
justified are: (1) whether the regulation has a logical connection with the
legitimate governmental interests invoked to justify the regulation, (2) whether
an alternative means exists for the inmate to exercise the constitutional right,
(3) the impact that accommodations of the asserted right would have on other
inmates, on prison personnel, and on allocation of prison resources, and (4)
the absence of ready alternatives. Id. (citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342, 350-53 (1987)). The statute then must be narrowly applied in order
to promote that interest. Id. at 1502. Maryland's DNA data banking statute
appears to be neutral and generally applied. Therefore, the courts would uphold
Maryland's data banking statute.
(2) Fifth Amendment-Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment protects an individual, in a criminal case, against
[Vol. 25
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A. The Fourth Amendment- Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
The creation of Maryland's DNA data base system and reposi-
tory raises the question whether or not collection of a "DNA
sample '" 2"1 from a convicted sex offender in anticipation that he will
commit a future crime constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure
that violates the convicted sex offender's Fourth Amendment rights.
Thus, the first question to be determined in analyzing a constitutional
challenge under the Fourth Amendment is whether a search or seizure
is involved. 2 6 It is well settled that blood tests constitute searches of
persons within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.2 17 Because
self-incrimination. "No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The privilege
against self-incrimination bars "compelling 'communications' or 'testimony,"'
from the accused but permits compelling 'real or physical evidence."' Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). The traditional form of finger-
printing does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege of an accused. Id.
Therefore, DNA fingerprinting should not violate the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege of an accused either. The privilege of self-incrimination, however, also
permits a person to refuse to answer questions which may incriminate him in
future criminal proceedings. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (citing
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)). Therefore, "[tlo the extent that
DNA analysis would later be used as an investigative tool in connection with
a crime not yet committed, it is questionable whether . . . the sample would
tend to incriminate an inmate." 91 Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 29, 1991 WL
535093 (Tenn. A.G. Mar. 28, 1991). Maryland courts would most likely find
that the collection, analysis, and storing of DNA samples under the Act would
be noncommunicative in nature and, therefore, would not be protected by the
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.
255. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, § 12A(a)(7) (1995). The statute defines a DNA
sample as "a bodily fluid or tissue sample". Id. A blood sample will most
likely be the most common specimen. However, the broad scope of the language
used in the statute also allows for other bodily fluids or tissues, such as saliva
or semen, to be collected.
256. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989); see
also City of Annapolis v. United Food and Commercial Workers, 317 Md.
544, 551, 565 A.2d 672, 675 (1989) (discussing Fourth Amendment challenge
to city's drug testing program for uniformed police and fire personnel). See
generally 91 Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 29, 1991 WL 535093 (Tenn. A.G. Mar.
28, 1991) (analyzing the constitutionality of Tennessee's DNA Data Bank
statute).
257. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (taking of blood
"plainly constitutes searches of 'persons,' . . . within the meaning of [the
Fourth] Amendment"); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 (finding that "physical
intrusions, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable"); People v. Wealer, 636
N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (indicating that the intrusion necessary
to obtain a sample of saliva would be lower than the intrusion necessary for
the extraction of blood).
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the Fourth Amendment only protects against "unreasonable" searches
and seizures, the next inquiry is whether or not the extraction of a
DNA sample from a convicted sex offender in anticipation that he
will commit future crimes is unreasonable. 258 A warrant issued upon
probable cause is generally the measure of reasonableness, however,
in its absence, application of a balancing test may determine whether
or not a search is unreasonable. 2 9 The case law that addresses the
Fourth Amendment implications of DNA data banks260 indicates that
three possible balancing tests may be applied in this situation: (1)
weighing the general privacy rights of a person to be free from
unjustified government intrusion against the government's "special
needs beyond normal law enforcement, ' 26' (2) weighing the limited
privacy rights of convicted persons against the government's inter-
est, 262 and (3) balancing the gravity of the intrusion upon personal
privacy, utilizing more traditional principles underlying the Fourth
Amendment, against the government's interest. 263 It is unclear which
of the three balancing tests the Maryland courts would adopt.
While there is no clear definition as to what constitutes special
needs beyond the normal needs of law enforcement, the State of
Maryland may argue that establishing a DNA Data Bank will deter
recidivist acts and, therefore, that the statute's purpose is not for
normal law enforcement. The Maryland courts would likely then
consider whether there is a substantial relationship between deterring
recidivism and the Act. If such a relationship exists, the courts would
weigh the state's interest against the general privacy rights of con-
victed sex offenders, the persons affected by the Act. In determining
258. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985);
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768; United Food and Commercial Workers, 317 Md.
at 551, 565 A.2d at 675.
259. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); United
Food and Commercial Workers, 317 Md. at 551, 565 A.2d at 675.
260. See, e.g., Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560-61 (9th Cir. 1995); Jones v.
Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 305-08 (4th Cir. 1992) (Murnaghan, I., concurring);
Vanderlinden v. State, 874 F. Supp. 1210, 1213-14 (D. Kan. 1995); Sanders v.
Coman, 864 F. Supp. 496, 499 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Jones v. Murray, 763 F.
Supp. 842, 844-48 (W.D. Va. 1991); People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 1131-
37 (I11. App. Ct. 1994); State v. Orozco, 878 P.2d 432, 435-36 (Or. Ct. App.
1994) (en banc); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1079-86 (Wash. 1993) (en
banc) (Utter, J., concurring).
261. See, e.g., Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 844-46; Olivas, 856 P.2d at 1084-86.
262. See, e.g., Jones, 962 F.2d at 307; Sanders, 864 F. Supp. at 499; Vanderlinden,
874 F. Supp. at 1215.
263. See, e.g., Rise, 59 F.3d at 1558-61; Jones, 962 F.2d at 311-13 (Murnaghan,
J., concurring); Wealer, 636 N.E.2d at 1135; Orozco, 878 P.2d at 435-36;
Olivas, 856 P.2d at 1090-92 (Utter, J., concurring).
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the convicted sex offenders' privacy rights, the courts would most
likely rely upon the well-settled authority establishing: (1) that blood
testing is a minimally intrusive search 264 and (2) that convicted persons
possess diminished privacy rights generally 265 and possess no expec-
tation of privacy in their identities. 266 While the outcome of the
"special needs" balancing test depends upon the particular facts of
the case, it is likely that the courts would find that the State of
Maryland has a compelling interest in deterring recidivist acts and
that the Act is substantially related to this goal. Therefore, as in
cases from other states, this compelling interest would probably
outweigh the minimal intrusion upon the convicted sex offender's
otherwise diminished privacy right in identification.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has indicated, however, that
the "special needs" exception only applies in non-criminal cases.
267
Under provisions of the Act, DNA testing is performed as a result
of a criminal conviction. Therefore, in the absence of a clear "ad-
ministrative justification independent of a law enforcement pur-
pose, ' ' 26 the Maryland courts may be reluctant to extend the "special
needs" exception to this statute, which applies to criminal cases.
If the Maryland courts determine that the Act does not fall
within the scope of the "special needs" doctrine, then the courts
may utilize the theory that convicted sex offenders have diminished
privacy rights under the Act. Maryland courts recognize that "a
convicted prisoner cannot avail himself of the full panoply of rights
and privileges which attend ordinary citizenship. Nonetheless, a con-
victed prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections
by reason of his conviction and incarceration. ' 269 Should the courts
264. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966).
265. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) (determining that proba-
tioners had a limited right to privacy against searches of their homes pursuant
to a program to ensure rehabilitation and safety); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 530 (1984) (holding that an inmate had no expectation of privacy in his
prison cell entitling him to Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559-60 (1979) (holding that body
cavity searches of pretrial detainees did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
266. Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 848; see Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969)
(holding that "fingerprinting constitutes a less serious intrusion upon personal
security than other types of police searches and detentions").
267. City of Annapolis v. United Food and Commercial Workers, 317 Md. 544,
551, 565 A.2d 672, 675 (1989) ("[Elxceptions to [the warrant requirement] are
proper in non-criminal cases 'when special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirements imprac-
ticable."').
268. People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 1135 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
269. Secretary, Dep't of Public Safety and Correctional Servs. v. Allen, 286 Md.
133, 137, 406 A.2d 104, 106 (1979); see also Brashear v. State, 90 Md. App.
19951
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find that the convicted sex offender possesses a limited privacy right
under the Fourth Amendment, this interest would be balanced against
the government's interest. Again, the courts would most likely de-
termine that the government has a compelling interest in deterring
recidivist acts that outweighs the convicted individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy. Therefore, the statute would likely be upheld
against a Fourth Amendment challenge.
Notwithstanding precedent in other jurisdictions for the first two
balancing tests, Maryland may be unwilling to reduce the privacy
rights of the convicted sex offender with regard to the Act. Should
this occur, the Maryland courts are likely to adopt the third test, the
more traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test. 270 Once again, it
would be expected that the courts would determine that the State of
Maryland has a compelling interest in deterring recidivist acts which
would most likely outweigh the minimally intrusive blood extraction
procedure.
27
Maryland courts would probably reject the argument that the
statute constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure and would
probably uphold the Act against a Fourth Amendment challenge
regardless of the balancing test applied.
B. The Constitutional Right to Privacy
A defendant may challenge the Act by alleging that the collection
of a DNA sample violates his constitutional right to privacy. To this
end, the defendant would have to prove that he has a legitimate
expectation of privacy. 2 2 "As a general matter, lawful detention or
imprisonment 'necessarily makes unavailable [to an inmate] many
rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen." '23 Although the in-
mate's constitutional protections are limited, such protections are not
wholly divested. 27 4 It is well established that a convicted person has
a limited privacy right with respect to his or her identity275 and
against searches .276
709, 603 A.2d 901 (1992) (recognizing that a prisoner has a limited expectation
of privacy).
270. See City of Annapolis v. United Food and Commercial Workers, 317 Md. 544,
565 A.2d 672 (1989) (noting that Maryland has utilized the traditional Fourth
Amendment balancing test in cases dealing with the chemical analysis of urine
samples for drug testing).
271. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (discussing the minimal
intrusion imposed by extracting blood).
272. Jones v. Murray, 763 F. Supp. 842, 849 (W.D. Va. 1991) (holding that "[tjo
the extent . . . the DNA analysis reveals identification characteristics," the
challenger failed to indicate a legitimate expectation of privacy).
273. Thomas v. State, 285 Md. 458, 463, 404 A.2d 257, 260 (1979) (quoting Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974)).
274. State v. Orozco, 878 P.2d 432, 436-39 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (Rossman, Edmonds,
De Muniz, J.J., concurring).
275. Id. at 436.
276. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
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The Act states that "[o]nly DNA records that directly relate to
the identification of individuals shall be collected and stored."277 If
the courts were to consider DNA analysis as nothing more than an
advanced form of traditional fingerprinting, which reveals no more
than a person's identity, then to the extent that convicted persons
do not have a constitutional right of privacy with regard to their
identities278 and to the extent that they have diminished privacy rights
from searches, 2 9 Maryland courts would probably hold that a legit-
imate expectation of privacy has not been established. Therefore, the
Act would not violate a convicted individual's constitutional right to
privacy.
Relying on the science underlying DNA analysis, a defendant
may argue that DNA fingerprinting is much more than an advanced
form of the traditional fingerprint. DNA contains the genetic code
for our most intimate characteristics. As a result, DNA fingerprinting
may decipher our complete, personal genetic history. At the present
time, "scientists around the world are working feverishly on a
multibillion-dollar 'Human Genome Project' to fully decipher [the
genetic] code."28 Once scientists have achieved this goal, DNA testing
may be able to utilize probes which will detect, among other things,
genetic disorders. At that point, it will not be true that DNA testing
merely establishes an individual's identity. Rather, it will expose for
public view an individual's entire genetic history.
Such concerns regarding future advances in the field of DNA
analysis are appropriate considering that the Act provides for a
repository for the DNA samples and does not indicate how long the
samples will be maintained;28' the samples may be retained indefinitely
and tested at a later date utilizing state of the art techniques. The
Fourth Circuit, however, has dismissed this line of argument and has
stated: "This matter must be addressed at a later date, as it is a
hypothetical concern at this time. ' 282 In accordance with the Fourth
Circuit, the Maryland courts would likely hold 283 that the capability
of ascertaining one's genetic history does not exist at the present
time and, therefore, must be addressed at a later, more appropriate
date.
276. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
277. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, § 12A(e)(2)(i) (1994).
278. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51; Orozco, 878 P.2d at 436.
279. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51; Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1559 (9th Cir. 1995).
280. Frank D. Roylance, DNA Banks: They're a Boon for Police but Do They
Violate Rights to Privacy, BALT. EvE. SUN, Oct. 15, 1991, at ID.
281. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, § 12A.
282. Jones v. Murray, 763 F. Supp. 842, 848 (W.D. Va. 1991).
283. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia deter-
mined, at that point in time, that law enforcement officials could not "gleanf]
one[s] genetic history from a DNA sample." Id. at 848 & n.15.
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If and when the government can "glean one's genetic history
from a DNA sample, ' ' 284 the Maryland legislature may continue to
avoid addressing a right to privacy challenge by, for example, limiting
the types of probes which may be utilized in the DNA analysis and,
thus, not allowing use of probes that identify genetic disorders. The
legislature may also consider clearly defining the term "identifica-
tion" within the Act to exclude the use of genetic disorders as a
means of "identification." If the DNA testing procedures are nar-
rowly tailored to prevent the disclosure of an individual's genetic
history, then the Act will probably withstand future challenges on
privacy grounds as well.
C. The Due Process Clause-Void for Vagueness
A defendant challenging the Act may assert that the statute is
void on the basis that the testing procedures are unconstitutionally
vague. For example, a statute may be "stricken for vagueness if it
fails to provide legally fixed standards and adequate guidelines for
... [those] whose obligation it is to enforce, apply and administer
the ... laws. ' 285 The constitutionality of a statute under attack on
the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague must be determined
strictly on the basis of the statute's application to the particular facts
at hand.
286
Under this due process analysis, the defendant has the burden
to establish that "the procedure used in drawing blood [is] uncon-
stitutional and not ... that the purpose for which [the] blood was
drawn [is] unconstitutional. ' 28 7 The Act specifically indicates that the
DNA sample shall be collected by an individual trained in such
procedures.288 The Supreme Court has stated that blood taken by a
trained individual, such as a physician or a technician, involves
minimal intrusion and, therefore, does not deny the defendant due
process of law. 289 Similarly, it would appear that the Maryland courts
would find that a DNA sample, which may be a blood specimen,
that is collected by a trained individual would not violate a defen-
dant's due process rights. Thus, Maryland courts are unlikely to find
the testing procedures of the Act to be unconstitutionally vague.
284. Id. at 848.
285. Bowers v. Maryland, 283 Md. 115, 121, 389 A.2d 341, 345 (1978).
286. Id. at 122, 389 A.2d at 346; see United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp.,
372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 36 (1963) (stating that the statute's constitutionality should
be trusted "as applied to the conduct with which the defendant is charged").
287. State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1086 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
288. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, § 12A(h).
289. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 759-60 (1966); Breithaupt v. Abram,
352 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1957); see also In re Z.P.B., 474 N.W.2d 651, 654
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
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D. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments-Equal Protection of
the Law
The Act requires "a person convicted of a qualifying crime of
violence ' 290 to submit a DNA sample for DNA analysis. In short,
the statute indicates that a "qualifying crime of violence" is a sexual
offense. 29' Because the Act requires DNA testing for sexual offenders
and not, for example, for inmates convicted of non-sexual offenses,
the Act could become vulnerable to a challenge that it violates a sex
offender's right to equal protection of the law under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Under an equal protection challenge, a court must apply the
appropriate standard of scrutiny. 292 The Supreme Court of Washing-
ton, in State v. Olivas, held that under a similar DNA data bank
statute the rational basis test applied because neither a suspect nor
a semi-suspect class was involved. 293 Under the rational basis test, a
court must determine whether or not "[tihere is a rational relationship
between the interest of the government in law enforcement and the
application of the statute to [the] class of persons.
' 294
One legitimate interest of the Act is "the furtherance of an
official investigation into a criminal offense. ' 295 In addition, Mary-
land courts may consider the higher probability of obtaining a
comparative DNA sample from a sexual crime scene versus other
crime scenes, thus making DNA testing a much more useful inves-
tigative tool in cases involving sexual offenses. Accordingly, it is
likely that the courts will find that performing DNA analysis on
convicted sex offenders, but not on other convicted persons, is
rationally related to the State of Maryland's legitimate interest of
deterring recidivist acts and furthering criminal investigations.
The Federal District Court for the District of Kansas, in Van-
derlinden v. State,296 however, held that because privacy rights were
implicated, the strict scrutiny test applied. 297 In order to uphold a
290. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, § 12A(a)(8) & (c).
291. Id. § 12A(a)(8).
292. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
293. State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1087 (Wash. 1993) (en banc); see also Gilbert
v. Peters, Nos. 93 C 20012, 92 C 20354, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9215 (N.D.
Ill. June 28, 1994).
294. Gilbert, Nos. 93 C 20012, 92 C 20354, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9215, at **24-
25 (N.D. Il. June 28, 1994); Olivas, 856 P.2d at 1087; see also Rinaldi v.
Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966) (indicating that the Equal Protection Clause
requires that the distinctions drawn bear some relevance to the purpose for
which the classification is made); see also U.S. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166, 174 (1980).
295. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, § 12A(e)(i).




statute under strict scrutiny, a court must find a compelling govern-
mental interest, and the statute must be narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest. 29 A court may find that "the furtherance of an official
investigation into a criminal offense ' ' 299 is a compelling governmental
interest. Also, there is a "relationship between the type of crimes
committed by [those individuals who are required by the Act to
submit a blood sample] and the likelihood of recovering DNA at the
scene of a crime committed by a recidivist." 3°0 Therefore, even if
the court utilized the more stringent, strict scrutiny standard, the Act
would likely not be deemed to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
E. The Ex Post Facto Clause-Article I of the Constitution
The Ex Post Facto Clause protects defendants from retrospective
legislation with a purposeful punitive effect. Legislation that has a
purposeful punitive effect is any legislation which: "[(1)] punishes
as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when
done; [(2)] makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime,
after its commission, or [(3)] deprives one charged with crime of any
defense available according to law at the time when the act was
committed. ..." Legislation possessing any one of these three
characteristics violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Maryland's DNA data bank and repository statute requires that
"[a] person who has been convicted of a qualifying crime of violence
prior to October 1, 1994 and who remains incarcerated on that date
shall submit a DNA sample ... ."2 As a result of this retroactive
collection, it is possible that a defendant may claim that the Act
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Other jurisdictions that have ruled on this issue have found that
the collection of samples for DNA testing is not penal and, thus,
cannot "itself, run[] afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause."3 3 None-
theless, prison officials can impose disciplinary measures for failure
to submit a sample without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.? 4 If
Maryland is in accord with other jurisdictions, then Maryland courts
298. Id.; see U.S. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 4.49 U.S. 166 (1980).
299. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, § 12A(e)(i).
300. Vanderlinden, 874 F. Supp. at 1217.
301. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169 (1925)).
302. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, § 12A(d).
303. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 1992); Gilbert v. Peters, Nos.
93 C 20012, 92 C 20354, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9215, at **28-29 (June 28,
1994) (quoting Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 1992)).
304. Jones, 962 F.2d at 309; Gilbert, Nos. 93 C 20012, 92 C 20354, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9215, at **28-29 (June 28, 1994) (citing Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d
302, 309 (4th Cir. 1992)); Ewell v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1993).
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will probably conclude that the Act is not penal in nature and that
it, therefore, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Thus far, the only successful challenge against any DNA data
banking statute on Ex Post Facto grounds occurred in Jones v.
Murray.0 5 In Jones, the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia's DNA
data bank statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause to the extent
that the Virginia statute could be enforced to modify mandatory
parole.3° Maryland's statute (the Act), however, does not contain
the same type of language that caused a portion of Virginia's statute
to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. In fact, the Act does not even
establish a deadline by which the sample must be provided.30 7 Thus,
it does not appear that Maryland courts would consider the Act to
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
F. The Eighth Amendment-Cruel and Unusual Punishment
DNA testing would be considered cruel and unusual punishment,
under the Eighth Amendment, if it involved "the unnecessary wanton
infliction of pain ' 108 and if it was "grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime." 3°9 The United States Supreme Court, in
Schmerber v. California,10 stated that blood testing "involves vir-
tually no risk, trauma, or pain." 31' Furthermore, the "collection of
a human biological specimen is a routine, safe procedure which does
not appear to involve the wanton infliction of pain.1 12 Therefore,
Maryland courts would probably decide that the Act does not violate
the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
305. Jones, 962 F.2d at 309-10.
306. Id. at 310 (invalidating the portion of the statute that "suggests that
'[n]otwithstanding [the mandatory release on parole requirement],' an inmate's
release can be delayed until he provides a blood sample").
307. A district court in Illinois held that a DNA data banking statute that required
the sample to be submitted "prior to discharge, parole, or release," presumably
closer to violating the Ex Post Facto Clause than Maryland's statute, could be
interpreted to prevent prison officials from holding noncomplying inmates
beyond the term of their sentences. Gilbert v. Peters, Nos. 93 C 20012, 92 C
20354, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9215, at *31 (June 28, 1994).
308. 91 Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 29, 1991 WL 535093 (Tenn. A.G. Mar. 28,
1991).
309. Id.; see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (recognizing that "[the
Eighth Amendment bars not only those punishments that are 'barbaric' but
also those that are 'excessive' in relation to the crime committed").
310. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
311. Id. at 771; see Jones v. Murray, 763 F. Supp. 842, 847 (W.D. Va. 1991) (citing
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).





DNA fingerprinting has revolutionized the nation's criminal jus-
tice system. The creation of DNA data banks will enhance and
expedite criminal investigations and will provide a substantial deter-
rent against sexual offenses. Maryland's General Assembly should be
commended for its recognition of DNA analysis and for its acceptance
of this emerging technology.
As long as DNA analysis remains no more than an advanced
identification system, the risk that it will violate an individual's
constitutional rights remains slight. However, Maryland lawmakers
must continue to monitor this ever-changing technology in order to
prevent substantial violations of privacy in the future. If improve-
ments in the science of DNA analysis should, in the future, enable
the state to determine an individual's genetic history, the legislature
will have to limit the analysis solely to identification characteristics.
In view of the current state of the science, however, DNA data
banking statutes provide tremendous law enforcement benefits.
Susan M. Dadio
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